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ABSTRACT 
 
 Tit-for-tat is a strategy of immediate and proportional 
responses. Game theorists showed that this strategy often leads to 
fruitful cooperation. Indeed, many legal regimes resemble a tit-for-
tat strategy and benefit from its ability to avoid unnecessary 
conflicts. But in situations of uncertainty—when actors cannot be 
sure about the actions of their adversaries—a tit-for-tat strategy 
would destroy cooperation and lead to continuous clashes. Because 
tit-for-tat responds immediately, a single mistake about the 
intentions of the adversary can lead to retaliation and start an 
endless string of counterstrikes. When uncertainty prevails, a 
strategy of many-tits-for-many-tats is optimal. Actors applying this 
strategy study the actions of their adversaries over multiple rounds 
without issuing an immediate response. Only when the actor is 
convinced that the adversary intentionally defects, will the actor 
issue a disproportionately forceful response. The laws of war, 
criminal law, and international sales law all face some situations 
of uncertainty. This Article argues that each of these legal fields 
adopts a strategy of many-tits-for-many-tats to address conditions 
of acute uncertainty.     
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I. INTRODUCTION 
  The rule of law depends on several foundational principles: the 
procedures that determine the existence of a legal breach and the 
form of the legal retaliation must be clear,1 wrongdoers can be 
punished only after they violate the law,2 and the response used 
against them must be proportional to the gravity of the breach3 and 
issued close to the time of the breach itself.4 These principles 
                                                                                                            
1. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 63–65 (rev. ed. 1969) (arguing 
that clarity is a crucial condition for legality).  
2. See id. at 53 (highlighting that while some rules within a system that is 
generally prospective can profitably have a retroactive effect, designing a legal 
system that is entirely retroactive is unthinkable, because law is intended to direct 
human conduct).  
3. See VICTOR TADROS, THE ENDS OF HARM: THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
CRIMINAL LAW 331–34 (2011) (explaining that the right to cause only a proportional 
harm to the harm caused to you or to the harm you can prevent by punishment is a 
general principle that underlies many fields of the law, including the laws of war 
and criminal law); Thomas A. Franck, On Proportionality of Countermeasures in 
International Law, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 715, 715–16 (2008) (suggesting that the 
general principle that countermeasures for transgressions must be proportional 
runs through the law, covering areas as different as the laws of war, constitutional 
law, and trade law).   
4. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 13–14 
(1998). A statute of limitations—preventing criminal prosecution after a set period 
of time—is a procedural principle that underlies criminal law. It is justified as a 
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concur with the attributes of a tit-for-tat strategy, a strategy that 
was found to lead to cooperation between parties in a variety of 
situations. A tit-for-tat strategy is clear (easy to understand), nice 
(does not defect first), retaliatory (responds immediately), and 
forgiving (responds proportionately).5 
 Consider the rule that a country may respond to hostilities 
directed against it by another country that do not amount to an 
“armed attack” only with steps that are immediate, necessary, and 
proportional.6 Or the rule that allows only proportional responses 
as a countermeasure even against an armed attack.7 These are 
clear examples of a tit-for-tat strategy. In interactions between 
well-organized countries of similar strength, this strategy allows 
each country to gauge the intentions of the other, promoting 
cooperation and preventing deterioration into war.  
 But in interactions between a stronger, well-organized country 
and a weaker country that cannot control militants acting from its 
own territory, a tit-for-tat rule can lead to a cycle of attacks and 
counterattacks. The stronger country may mistake hostilities by 
militants acting from the territory of the weaker country as 
deliberate attacks by the weaker country. If the stronger country 
responds immediately, the weaker country may retaliate, and both 
countries will spiral into a series of counterreprisals culminating in 
war.  
 If, however, countries were allowed to delay their response as 
they analyzed the actions and intentions of the other country and 
after a while respond with disproportionate force, the deterioration 
may be prevented. Furthermore, future aggression can be 
prevented by incapacitating or weakening the enemy, not just by 
deterring it. If a stronger country is allowed to use disproportionate 
force, it can minimize the ability—not only the motivation—of the 
weaker country to harm it. What is needed to serve these goals is 
simply a doctrine of many-tits-for-many-tats.  
 Developments in the international laws of war follow this 
logic. They allow a country to accumulate several small attacks 
against it that do not individually constitute an “armed attack” and 
treat them all as an armed attack that deserves a strong response.8 
Furthermore, even a response to an armed attack is constrained by 
some level of proportionality, but states can aggregate several 
armed attacks, using the so-called “pin-pricks” doctrine, and 
respond to all of them together with a force far greater than that 
mandated by each individual attack.9 
                                                                                                            
check on the state's powers of investigation and prosecution without reflecting on 
the morality of the criminal act itself. Id.  
5. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 54 (1984).  
6. See infra Part III.A.  
7. See infra Part III.B.  
8. See infra Part III.A. 
9. See infra Part III.B. 
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 Criminal law offers another example of this dynamic. Usually, 
criminal sanctions are directed at a specific violation of the law and 
are proportional to the gravity of the violation. The state therefore 
uses a tit-for-tat strategy against potential offenders. Some 
jurisdictions, however, adopt disproportionate penalties against 
repeat offenders that are intended to remove such offenders from 
society for a very long time. One form of escalating punishments for 
repeat offenders is the so-called “three-strikes-and-you’re-out” 
rule.10 These rules are directed against recidivist offenders that 
chose a life of crime and are likely to commit more crimes in the 
future if released (career offenders). The ability to aggregate 
information over several offenses before a disproportionate 
response is used allows the state to separate these career offenders 
from offenders who committed a single offense without adopting 
crime as a way of life. Even if the state knows that an accused 
committed an offense with certainty, it is only the accumulation of 
offenses that allows the state to know this crime is not a result of a 
mistake or a one-time opportunity, but rather the actions of a 
career offender.  
 A third strike can separate a career offender from society and 
incapacitate his ability to commit more crimes.11 The 
disproportionate response that is meted out as a “third strike” 
might deter potential career offenders from committing even their 
first crime because they know they may not be able to avoid 
committing crimes in the future and therefore a first crime 
increases the chances that they will end up suffering this greater 
penalty.12 
 International sales law offers another example for a legal 
regime that is generally committed to proportional responses. The 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale 
of Goods (CISG)13 allows a party to an international business 
contract to respond to a breach by the other party in a proportional 
                                                                                                            
10.  he most severe and the most famous “three strikes and you're out” law is 
probably the one that went into force in California in March 1994. This law counts 
as a “strike” every conviction for a serious or violent felony (some examples include 
murder, rape, robbery, kidnapping, burglary committed in an occupied house, drug 
sale to minors, or a felony committed with a deadly weapon). A criminal with one 
“strike” who is convicted of any later felony—even if it is not a “strike”—will face a 
doubling of the sentence for the later conviction and cannot be released before 80 
percent of that sentence is served. A criminal with two “strikes” convicted of any 
additional felony will face a prison sentence of 25 years to life and cannot be released 
before serving 80 percent of the 25-year term. See Eric Helland & Alexander 
Tabarrok, Does Three Strikes Deter? A Non-Parametric Estimation, 42 J. HUM. 
RESOURCES 309, 309–10 (2007). Many other states have passed similar laws to 
which the same analysis applies, see Joanna M. Shepherd, Fear of the First Strike: 
The Full Deterrent Effect of California's Two- and Three-strikes Legislation, 31 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 159, 159–60 (2002). 
11. See infra Part IV.B. 
12. See infra Part IV.C. 
13. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods, art. 50, April 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CISG]. 
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manner.14 If the breach is fundamental, the damaged party can 
avoid the contract, releasing it from all its contractual 
obligations.15 If the breach is not fundamental, the damaged party 
can only take certain countermeasures that are proportional to the 
gravity of the breach and intended to save the contract.16 In 
addition, it can also sue the other side for damages.17  
 Nevertheless, if a seller—in breach of the agreement—does not 
deliver the goods on time, the buyer may set an extended period for 
fulfilling the contract. The buyer has to inform the seller of this 
extended period in what is known as a “Nachfrist Notice.”18 If the 
seller does not deliver within the extended period, the buyer can 
avoid the contract, thereby responding disproportionately to a 
continuing violation even if it does not constitute a fundamental 
breach. The grace period given to the seller allows the buyer to 
gauge the seller’s intentions before issuing that disproportionate 
response.19   
 These examples demonstrate that legal systems often have a 
preference for immediate and proportional responses and, by this, 
favor a tit-for-tat strategy. This Article argues that in some 
situations—particularly in conditions of uncertainty—a 
disproportionate and delayed response is preferable as it can deter 
more effectively and prevent the ability to commit future violations. 
A strategy of many-tits-for-many-tats that allows the responder to 
aggregate several wrongful actions toward it before it responds 
with a strong sanction may therefore be sometimes preferable. This 
analysis justifies and explains certain legal regimes that contradict 
the predominant tit-for-tat strategy. 
 Part II describes the tit-for-tat strategy, the game theory that 
supports its use, and the situations in which it will lead to 
inefficient results. Part III presents the laws of war that usually 
prevent countries from responding disproportionately to hostilities 
against them and reviews several cases in which a disproportionate 
response is nevertheless legal. Part IV presents the benefits of 
disproportionate penalties for repeat offenders in criminal law. 
Part V reviews a disproportionate response to breach of contract in 
international sales law as an exception to the general proportional 
responses allowed by the CISG. Part VI concludes. 
  
                                                                                                            
14. See infra Part V.B. 
15. CISG, supra note 13, art. 49(1)(a), 64. 
16. See infra Part V.B. 
17. See infra Part V.B.  
18. CISG, supra note 13, art. 47(1), 49(1)(b).  
19. See infra Part V.C. 
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II. THE TIT-FOR-TAT STRATEGY AND ITS WEAKNESSES 
 In some situations, cooperation is a strategically wise choice: 
all drivers are better off driving on the right side of the road in New 
York and on the left side of the road in London. These situations 
are known in game theory as coordination games.20 They only 
require a good source of information and a little patience to lead 
rational players to cooperative behavior that is beneficial to both of 
them.21 
 Unfortunately, not all situations in life can be modeled as a 
coordination game. There are situations in which the rational thing 
for both parties to do is to betray each other. The most notorious 
situation of this kind is known as the prisoner’s dilemma. The 
metaphor behind the prisoner’s dilemma is a story in which two 
accomplices are caught in the middle of a crime. The police put 
them in separate rooms and make each the same exact offer: “If you 
choose to rat on your friend and he stays silent, you will get out 
without a penalty and your friend will stay in prison for a very long 
time. If you confess and so does your friend, you will both get a 
couple of years in prison. If you both stay silent, you will both go to 
prison for only one year. Finally, remember that we made your 
friend the same offer.”22 
 A rational prisoner would quickly realize that the smart thing 
to do is always to rat on his partner. If the partner stays silent, the 
snitch would go home scot-free. If the partner confesses, telling the 
police what you know can reduce your penalty from many years to 
just a couple of years in prison. Given that both prisoners are 
rational and egoist, they would always betray each other.23  
 The tragic thing about the prisoner’s dilemma is that if both 
prisoners confess, they would both go to prison for a couple of years. 
                                                                                                            
20. See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 11–12 (2005) (explaining that one of the reasons countries 
respect international borders is simply coordination—the countries want to avoid 
conflict and they do not have a particular interest to increase their border at the 
expense of their neighbor); THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 54 
(1960) (giving examples of strategic coordination in everyday life); Tom Ginsburg & 
Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy: An Expressive Theory of 
International Dispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1229, 1244–45 (2004) 
(Describing games of pure coordination—such as the decision on which side of the 
road to drive—and distinguishing them from mixed motive games in which parties 
have both shared and conflicting interests. Many disputes between nations can be 
modeled as mixed motive games). 
21. See SCHELLING, supra note 20, at 57 (suggesting that people who want 
to coordinate around a choice can usually do so even absent communication by 
discerning clues or “focal points” using their imagination and prior information 
about each other); David S. Law, A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial Review, 
97 GEO. L.J. 723, 757–64 (2009) (explaining how courts can solve coordination 
problems by providing a "focal point" that parties can coordinate around to avoid a 
conflict).  
22. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME 
THEORY AND THE LAW 33 (1994) (describing the prisoner's dilemma with slightly 
different values that follow the same logic). 
23. Id. at 34.   
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They could have each spent just one year in prison if only they 
cooperated and decided to keep their lips sealed. When the game is 
played only once, however, this cooperation is impossible because 
both parties have an incentive to betray each other regardless of 
what their partner chooses to do.24 
 But when the prisoner’s dilemma game is played multiple 
times, cooperation can certainly emerge.25 Both parties can realize 
that defecting may mean they get a bigger reward for this round, 
but it can also provoke the other side to defect in future rounds. In 
contrast, being nice this time around may mean you gain only a 
small reward, but it can motivate the other party to play nice in the 
future.26 
 This does not mean that it pays to play nice all the time. 
Nobody wants to be the sucker and lead the other side to think that 
it can always take advantage of your kindness. Clearly, a good 
strategy needs to react to the actions of the other party and to try 
to maximize your own rewards, knowing that the other side does 
the same. The question is how to do that. What is the best strategy 
to play the prisoner’s dilemma game? 
A. When Tit-for-Tat Is Optimal 
 Political scientist Robert Axelrod offered a practical solution 
to this problem. He constructed a tournament for computer 
programs that played multiple rounds of a bilateral game with 
                                                                                                            
24. Id.  
25. See KEN BINMORE, GAME THEORY: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 71–76 
(2007). If a prisoner's dilemma is played for a set number of times, parties will still 
not cooperate because everyone knows that in the last round defection would occur, 
which means that defection is the smart strategy in the round before that, and so 
on using backward induction until the beginning. However, cooperation can emerge 
in an indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma. The insight that parties can 
cooperate in an indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma is so famous and 
uncontroversial that it is known as a "folk theorem." Id.  
A similar problem to the prisoner's dilemma only with multiple members 
instead of two parties is the so-called "tragedy of the commons." The tragedy of the 
commons is exemplified in situations in which farmers share a common grazing 
ground. For each farmer, it pays to have more cows using the common pool, no 
matter what the others do. But if all farmers add more cows, the grass will not 
regenerate and all the cattle will die. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of 
the Commons, SCI. MAG., Dec. 13, 1968, at 1243. Scholars have shown that multiple-
player prisoner's dilemmas can also be solved when the parties are able to cooperate 
and prevent free riding by other players. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF 
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 33–34 (1965) 
(explaining that small groups are better able to prevent free riding than bigger 
groups, because in small group each member gains enough from cooperation to have 
an incentive to enforce cooperation on other members); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING 
THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 6–14 
(1990) (explaining that in real life situations people can change the rules of multiple-
player prisoner's dilemmas and foster cooperation; by empirically studying 
successful cases of cooperation, the conditions that allow cooperation to emerge can 
be distilled).  
26. See BINMORE, supra note 25.   
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positive rewards that complied with the prisoner’s dilemma logic. 
Each program was matched with every one of the others, and the 
rewards of all the matches were averaged.27 Scientists tried to win 
the tournament by programming all kinds of strategies—some of 
them very complicated—but the definitive winner of the 
tournament was the tit-for-tat strategy.28  
 This simple strategy—devised by the Canadian psychologist 
Anatol Rapoport—played “cooperate” in the first round, and then 
repeated whatever the other party played in the previous move.29 
The result was that tit-for-tat gained the highest average reward 
from all the other programs in almost all iterations of the 
tournament.30  
 When called upon to account for the unusual success of the tit-
for-tat strategy, Axelrod explained that it combines four different 
qualities that together make it a winner: (1) it is nice enough to 
start the game with cooperation, which prevents the less vicious 
programs from punishing it with defection; (2) it is retaliatory, 
which convinces the other programs not to try to take advantage of 
it; (3) it is forgiving, which helps it to avoid an endless spiral of 
reprisals, at least in some situations; and (4) it is clear enough to 
be understood by the other programs, which is a prerequisite for 
long-term cooperation.31 
B. A Delayed Response Deals Well with Noise 
 Now imagine that you take away tit-for-tat’s last and most 
important advantage: its clarity. Everybody can understand tit-for-
tat because every one of its actions is accurately registered by its 
opponent who quickly figures out the strategy behind it. What if 
you added some noise to the system? If tit-for-tat plays “cooperate” 
but the game-master manipulates its actions into a “defect,” 
cooperation can break down pretty easily. To take a simple 
example: two friendly tit-for-tat programs in this predicament will 
fall into an endless vortex of defections, just because of a single 
manipulation.32 
 Tit-for-tat benefits from being clear to its opponents, but it also 
benefits from its ability to quickly retaliate toward offenses and to 
quickly forgive an opponent who shifts back to cooperative 
                                                                                                            
27. AXELROD, supra note 5, at vii-viii.  
28. Id. at viii.   
29. Id.  
30. Id. at 48.  
31. Id. at 54.  
32. If both programs are manipulated to defect at the same round, they 
would both respond by defecting in all future rounds. If program A defects once, 
program B would respond by defection in the next round. While in the next round 
program A would again cooperate, copying the actions of program B in the previous 
round, program B would now defect. The round after that program A would defect 
in response, while program B would play cooperate. This weird sequence of 
cooperate-defect pairs would go on indefinitely unless there are future 
manipulations. See AVINASH K. DIXIT & BARRY J. NALEBUFF, THE ART OF STRATEGY 
76 (2008).  
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behavior. Adding noise makes tit-for-tat’s quick response time into 
a disadvantage. The noise added into the system can mistakenly 
provoke tit-for-tat to defect. Many adversary programs would not 
take tit-for-tat’s defection lying down and would respond by 
defecting in later rounds.  
 Scholars have experimented with “noisy” tournaments to 
determine which strategy is superior in conditions of uncertainty—
when the true actions of adversaries are not known for sure. One 
group of scholars invited experts to send programs to compete in a 
tournament quite similar to Axelrod’s tournament, only with an 
element of noise that would overrule the choices of the programs in 
some randomly selected rounds of the game. To make things more 
interesting, the tournament allowed each player to choose the level 
of cooperation between zero and one hundred in every round 
instead of making a binary choice to defect or cooperate, while still 
preserving payoffs that form the prisoner’s dilemma.33 The result: 
tit-for-tat placed eighth out of thirteen programs submitted to the 
tournament, a very poor performance indeed.34 As one would 
suspect, tit-for-tat spiraled into unnecessary circles of reprisals 
because its reactions are immediate. In a noisy environment, 
immediate responses fail.  
 Who won this noisy tournament? The winner was a program 
called “nice-and-forgiving.” This program did not react immediately 
to every case of noncooperation. Instead, it continued to cooperate 
fully as long as the cooperation level of its adversary did not fall 
below a certain threshold. The program even ignored a single case 
of extreme defection to study whether its opponent would continue 
this militant line.35 The logic behind the winning program was to 
retaliate only when it was convinced that the opponent’s defection 
was intentional and not simply noise.36 
 When “nice-and-forgiving” played with an identical program 
in the noisy environment, their average cooperation level was 
ninety-nine out of one hundred: close to perfection despite the 
noise.37 In contrast, a “tit-for-tat” playing against itself averaged 
seventy-one out of one hundred, reflecting the spiral of unnecessary 
reprisals generated by the noise.38 More generally, generous 
programs in the noisy tournament that did not rush to punish their 
                                                                                                            
33. Jonathan Bendor, Roderick M. Kramer & Suzanne Stout, When in 
Doubt…Cooperation in a Noisy Prisoner's Dilemma, 35 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 691, 694 
(1991).  
34. Id. at 696.  
35. See id. at 707–09 (giving a description of the strategy). This nice strategy 
even dropped its cooperation gradually when the opponent fell below the threshold. 
In addition, the "forgiving" part of this strategy was manifested by going back to 
play full cooperation when the adversary passed certain thresholds of cooperative 
behavior. See id. at 697.  
36. See id. at 706.  
37. See id. at 697.  
38. Id. at 696–97.   
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adversary for low levels of cooperation did better than programs 
that were more retaliatory.39 The longer the game continued, the 
more chances there were for vengeance resulting from noise. 
Therefore, retaliatory programs would do worse and worse 
compared to generous ones.40 
 The results of the noisy tournament described here were 
repeated in other experiments. The literature confirmed that when 
there is uncertainty about the behavior of the other side, it is better 
not to respond immediately and with the same level of defection.41 
It is better to give the other side the benefit of the doubt. 
C. Using Stronger Penalties to Sustain Deterrence  
 One constraint of the tournaments described above, however, 
is a bit misleading. In the tournaments, players are stuck with 
their opponents for as long as the gamemaster decided in advance. 
Real life is not like this. If somebody rips us off repeatedly, we are 
entitled to stop doing business with him. A disproportionate 
response may simply be a way of terminating a bad relationship.   
 The example from international sales law is instructive. If 
delaying the response allows a contractor to make sure that her 
interlocutor cannot be trusted, the best response is to cut the 
connection and annul the deal. This may be a disproportionate 
response, but its purpose is not to punish or to deter, just to prevent 
any further harm.  
 Another constraint of the tournaments described above is that 
the actions of each player are known only to its adversary. Other 
players cannot learn the behavior of actors they did not interact 
with. They cannot be deterred by a program that acts aggressively 
vis-à-vis its adversary. Programs cannot build a reputation that 
exceeds the program they are currently paired with.   
 In contrast, every criminal system realizes that the main 
objective of criminal law is to deter potential criminals.42 Once the 
crime has already been committed, it may cost more to punish the 
criminal than the gains society would achieve from incapacitating 
his ability to commit crimes or from his rehabilitation. However, 
the penalty may deter other potential criminals from committing 
similar crimes because they want to avoid a similar punishment.  
                                                                                                            
39. Id. at 701.  
40. Id. at 706.  
41. See Jianzhong Wu & Robert Axelrod, How to Cope with Noise in the 
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, 39 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 183, 185 (1995). In a repetition 
of Axelrod's tournament with 1 percent of noise—turning defection into cooperation 
and cooperation into defection—the highest score was reached by a "generous" 
version of tit-for-tat that cooperates 10 percent of the time when a simple tit-for-tat 
would defect. Generosity is intended specifically to break the cycle of reprisals. Id.  
42. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1193, 1205–14 (1985) (discussing the deterrent function of criminal law 
using economic analysis). 
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 To the extent that potential criminals are rational agents, they 
will commit crimes only if the benefits from the crime outweigh the 
costs of suffering the penalty multiplied by the probability of being 
punished.43 The generosity manifested in letting certain crimes go 
without punishment may be necessary to ensure that only career 
offenders are punished, but at the same time it reduces the 
probability for all criminals of being punished for their crimes. The 
simple solution to get the optimal level of deterrence—envisioned 
already by Gary Becker, who pioneered the rationalist view of 
criminals—is to increase the magnitude of the penalty.44 Other 
things being equal, increasing the magnitude of the penalty will 
compensate for the lower probability of punishment to reach the 
optimal level of deterrence.45 
 But what if the punishment is very costly for the punisher? In 
the example of a powerful country facing smaller enemies, war may 
be useful to degrade the military capacity of its rivals and it may 
also serve as a deterrent for future aggressors, but it is extremely 
costly and dangerous. Imagine a situation in which a powerful 
country is surrounded by ten militant groups. It is not able to 
incapacitate all of them at a reasonable cost. If all ten militias 
attack it at the same time, the country would not be able to initiate 
a full war against all of them without suffering unacceptable losses. 
Is a disproportionate counterattack even an option for a country in 
this predicament? 
 For the threat of a disproportionate attack to be effective, it 
must be credible. Traditional game theory thinking would not 
generate a credible threat under the conditions described above. 
The reason is that if nine militias attack the country, the country 
does not have an incentive to initiate a full-scale war against the 
tenth militia because this war would not deter anybody else 
anyway. This makes sure that the tenth militia would decide to 
attack. That implies, in turn, that when militia number nine 
decides whether to attack or not, it can be guaranteed that militias 
one to eight as well as militia number ten would all choose to 
attack, giving the state no incentive to initiate a war against it. 
Militia number nine would therefore choose to attack, giving 
exactly the same incentive to militia number eight and so on, in a 
process known as “backward induction.” This process would 
continue until all militias choose to attack. Under this logic, the 
powerful country does not have any credible threat that can deter 
its enemies.  
 Nevertheless, as Reinhard Selten demonstrated in what he 
called “the chain store paradox,” human beings tend to behave in 
                                                                                                            
43. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of 
Public Enforcement of Law, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45, 47–48 (2000).   
44. See generally  Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic 
Approach, J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968). 
45. See id. at 180–85.  
 
1086         VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 51:1075 
situations such as these using limited rationality that contradicts 
the logic of backward induction.46 For the powerful country, the 
right thing to do is to fight extremely aggressively against the first 
militia that attempts an attack. This will take that militia out of 
the game and send a deterring message to all the others. Even if 
the militias know that the powerful country cannot initiate a war 
against all of them at the same time, they may all be effectively 
deterred.  
 The upshot of this analysis is that once delaying the response 
guarantees a high probability of identifying an intentional attack, 
a disproportionately strong counterstrike is mandated. Sometimes 
the disproportionate counterstrike would prevent the possibility of 
future transgressions. If that is not possible, it may optimize 
deterrence given that some intentional attacks would go 
unpunished. Even if there is no credible threat to respond 
disproportionately to all future attacks, a disproportionate 
counterstrike may be the only effective deterrent, which works 
because of the limited rationality of human behavior.  
 To sum up, in conditions of uncertainty, an immediate reaction 
may lead to harmful and unnecessary reprisals. The smart thing to 
do is to delay the response until enough information is gathered to 
discern that offenses are intentional. But then the counterattack 
must be disproportionately strong to incapacitate or to effectively 
deter the transgressor and other possible transgressors. The 
following Parts demonstrate how this logic works out in different 
areas of the law.  
III. PROPORTIONALITY AND THE LAWS OF WAR 
 On May 26, 2015, a large rocket exploded in the southern 
Israeli town of Gan Yavne.47 The explosion caused a fifteen-year-
old girl severe anxiety and she was evacuated to a nearby 
hospital.48 This was the very first time a rocket of this size and 
range was fired from Gaza since the 2014 Israel-Gaza conflict, also 
known as Operation Protective Edge.49 During that operation, 
more than 4,500 rockets and mortar bombs were fired at Israel. 
                                                                                                            
46. See Reinhard Selten, The Chain Store Paradox, 9 THEORY & DECISION 
127, 127–33 (1978). When a chain store faces potential competition by local stores 
in many different cities, it can use predatory pricing to fight off the opening of 
competitor stores in these cities, but it cannot lower prices to fight potential 
competitors in all the cities at the same time. Just like in the example described 
above, backward induction would suggest that competitors would arise in all the 
cities, but a deterrence theory that decides to fight aggressively against the first 
competitors may deter all competitors from entering the market. Id.  
47. See Matan Zuri et al., First Since Protective Edge: Grad Fired from Gaza. 
The IDF Attacked in the Gaza Strip, YNETNEWS (May 27, 2015), 
http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4661653,00.html [https://perma.cc/H6A5-
TWTK] (archived Aug. 16, 2018).  
48. See id. 
49. See id.  
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Sixty-eight Israeli soldiers and five civilians were killed, while 
Palestinian casualties totaled more than 2,100.50  
 Nobody on the Israeli side knew exactly who fired the rocket, 
which broke the long silence following the recent catastrophic 
conflict.51 Rockets of this size are held and even locally produced 
by the military wing of Hamas, the organization that controls the 
Gaza strip.52 Israelis assessed that the leadership of Hamas feared 
the grave consequences of another conflict with Israel.53 But the 
military wing of Hamas was more aggressive and may have tried 
to provoke Israel by firing the rocket.54 Nevertheless, it is also 
possible that the rocket was fired by a competing organization 
called Islamic Jihad, which is financed by Iran.55 The leadership of 
this smaller organization was probably also interested in 
preserving the ceasefire, but some armed groups within the 
organization may have wanted to take a more militant line.56 
Finally, it is also possible that the rocket was fired by some splinter 
group from the extremely radical Islamic Salafi movement.57 These 
fanatic groups fight a bloody war against Hamas, which arrested 
many of their men.58 They may have had an interest in plunging 
Hamas into a conflict with Israel to revenge these arrests.59 
 What should Israel have done? Preserving the deterrence 
against Hamas was crucial. It was the only way to ensure an end 
to the rocket fire on Israeli cities. If Israel would have known for 
sure that Hamas was responsible for this rocket, a proportional 
                                                                                                            
50. The exact number of Palestinian casualties and the proportion of civilian 
casualties to militants killed are fiercely debated. See ANNEX—PALESTINIAN 
FATALITY FIGURES IN THE 2014 GAZA CONFLICT A-2 (2014), 
http://mfa.gov.il/ProtectiveEdge/Documents/PalestinianFatalities.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X2AU-XTCR] (archived Aug. 16, 2018) (noting that 44 percent of 
the Palestinian casualties were militants); Paul Farhi, Reporters Grapple With 
Politics, Erratic Sources in Reporting Israeli/Gaza Death Toll, THE WASH. POST 
(Aug. 4, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/reporters-grapple-
with-politics-erratic-sources-in-reporting-israeligaza-deathtoll/2014/08/04/ 
c02ab282-1c10-11e4-ae540cfe1f974f8a_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term= 
.40c76e5453e3 [https://perma.cc/9D6D-6GBA] (archived Aug. 6, 2018); Ministry: 
Death Toll from Gaza Offensive Topped 2,310, MA'AN NEWS AGENCY (Jan. 3, 2015), 
http://www.maannews.com/Content.aspx?id=751290 [https://perma.cc/722T-
2MRW] (archived Aug. 5, 2018) (reporting that Palestinian deaths totaled over 
2,300). 
51. Ron Ben-Yishai, Challenging the Leadership of Israel and Hamas, 
YNETNEWS (May 26, 2015), www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4661681,00.html 
[https://perma.cc/R89H-DNFV] (archived Aug. 16, 2018). 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Id.  
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counterstrike would be the logical thing to do to maintain 
deterrence.60 This is what the tit-for-tat strategy recommends.61 
 Given the uncertainty about the identity of the shooters, 
however, a tit-for-tat strategy would be a problematic choice. What 
if the rocket was fired by groups that only wanted to weaken 
Hamas by provoking an Israeli response? And what if Hamas is 
provoked by an Israeli response and retaliates by firing more 
rockets? The entire situation can easily escalate into war.  
 If, however, Israel would decide not to retaliate—or to strike 
back in a way that would not cause much harm to Hamas and 
would likely not lead to a counterstrike—long-term deterrence may 
suffer. Hamas may use the uncertainty about its actions to strike 
Israeli cities whenever it wants. Therefore, if Israel decides not to 
respond to each individual strike, it must make clear to Hamas that 
every rocket is registered. Once enough transgressions accumulate 
to make it absolutely clear that Hamas has fired or supports the 
firing of rockets, Israel will respond with disproportionate force—
much greater than that mandated by each individual strike. 
Expecting that, Hamas will hopefully be deterred. Furthermore, if 
Israel initiates such a powerful counterstrike it can significantly 
degrade the military abilities of Hamas, by hitting munition silos, 
arms factories, and military personnel. This would make it 
physically impossible for Hamas to launch intensive strikes against 
Israeli citizens in the future.62 In other words, what is required 
from Israel is a strategy of many-tits-for-many-tats.  
 Would such a strategy be legal under international law? Every 
real-life example presents many unique features which raise 
specific legal questions,63 but the issue of military counterstrikes 
under conditions of uncertainty is not unique to Israel. The United 
States and other countries participating in the war on terror face a 
                                                                                                            
60. Cf. Alon Cohen & Raphael Bitton, The Threshold Requirement in 
Asymmetric Conflicts: A Game Theory Analysis, 16 CHI. J. INT'L L. 43, 48, 78 (2015) 
(showing through game theory that a swift military response to terrorism by a 
powerful country against a weaker adversary can minimize terror attacks, but also 
noting that this solution often does not occur because parties are able to 
communicate and negotiate alternative solutions).  
61. See AXELROD, supra note 5, at 79–80. Retaliation for attacks deterred the 
enemy and ensured some level of coexistence between the enemy sides in the 
trenches of World War I. The soldiers usually responded with a more extreme strike 
than the attack targeting them. However, because not every bullet fired actually hit 
its target and because the other side noted that the counter-attack is a retaliation, 
escalation was often prevented. Id. 
62. One concentrated attack has another advantage over many small 
skirmishes for the stronger country: the longer the hostilities continue, the better 
the weaker army becomes and the greater the disintegration of the stronger army. 
See Martin van Creveld, Power in War, 7 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1, 5–8 (2006) 
(explaining that the weaker side always learns and evolves as it finds a stronger 
enemy, whereas the stronger enemy backslides both because it does not face military 
challenges and because it will inevitably be portrayed as either a villain or 
incompetent).  
63. For a discussion of many of the unique legal problems of the Israel–
Hamas conflict see HAMAS, THE GAZA WAR AND ACCOUNTABILITY, UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Mark Ami-El ed., Jerusalem Ctr. for Pub. Affairs 2011).  
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very similar predicament. To accommodate the need of these 
countries, international law is evolving. Doctrines are forming that 
allow states to wait instead of responding immediately and then to 
strike back with a force proportionate to the aggregate of all 
transgressions but wildly disproportionate to each individual 
transgression. Such doctrines are the subjects of the next subparts.  
A. “Armed Attack” and the Accumulation Doctrine 
 The laws of war are divided into two categories: (1) jus ad 
bellum: the laws that set the conditions under which countries may 
use armed force or fight a legal war and (2) jus in bello: the laws 
that regulate the conduct of armies during war. Before 
investigating the types of military actions armies can employ at 
war under jus in bello, countries must make sure that the use of 
force is at all legal under jus ad bellum.   
 The most fundamental rule of jus ad bellum is enshrined in 
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter. It declares that 
countries “shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state[.]”64 But this rule has an important 
exception: countries have the right to use self-defense in response 
to an “armed attack” according to Article 51 of the Charter.65 
 An “armed attack” means the use of force by entering the 
territory of another country or firing weapons across the border.66 
However, to constitute an armed attack, this assault must be of 
some minimal level of gravity.67 Scholars have disputed the exact 
scale and effects that are necessary to form an armed attack, but 
even scholars setting a very low threshold usually require some 
threshold of severity to classify an assault as an armed attack.68 
 This means, of course, that some assaults could occur that 
would not count as armed attacks. Countries are not allowed to use 
self-defense in response to such assaults. But must the victims of 
these assaults sit and do nothing? Not exactly. Countries are 
allowed to respond by taking measures that are similar to self-
defense but do not reach the same level of intensity.69 The view of 
some international lawyers is that countries are allowed to 
                                                                                                            
64. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. 
65. Id. art. 51; see also YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-
DEFENCE 197 (6th ed. 2017) (discussing Article 51).  
66. DINSTEIN, supra note 65, at 208.  
67. Id. at 206.   
68. Id. at 209–11; cf. David Kretzmer, The Inherent Right of Self-Defence and 
Proportionality in Jus Ad Bellum, 24 EUR. J. INT'L L. 235, 242–43 (2013) (referring 
to some scholars that require different thresholds of severity to constitute an armed 
attack and to some sources that do away with this requirement altogether).  
69. See DINSTEIN, supra note 65, at 207 (discussing the International Court 
of Justice holding that such lawful measures that are similar but less grave than 
self-defense are allowed).  
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retaliate against assaults that fall short of armed attacks with force 
which falls short of self-defense.70  The retaliation must be strictly 
necessary, proportionate, and immediate in time.71 
 This doctrine of retaliation possesses the qualities of the tit-
for-tat strategy. The doctrine allows countries to swiftly respond in 
kind to attacks against them and creates a perfect deterrent in 
situations of symmetric rivals with full information. However, 
when countries are not sure who attacked them—a common 
situation in asymmetric warfare—this tit-for-tat strategy can prove 
disastrous. It can plunge both countries into a series of 
countermeasures that would quickly escalate into all-out war.  
 Ignoring incidents short of armed attack is not an option in a 
situation of asymmetric warfare either. This would allow the 
aggressor to take advantage of the generosity of the victim and 
keep launching small attacks with impunity. What is required is a 
doctrine of many-tits-for-many-tats and such a doctrine exists 
under international law.  
 Scholars have argued that an accumulation of assaults that 
each fall short of an armed attack may collectively constitute an 
armed attack.72 Countries are therefore allowed to study their 
opponent and calculate the gravity of all its assaults taken 
together. When the combination of all the small assaults reaches 
the level of an armed attack, the country may respond by using self-
defense, which implies a much greater ability to use force than the 
level allowed for countermeasures short of self-defense. 
International lawyers have therefore formed a strategy of many-
tits-for-many-tats that allows countries to better address situations 
of uncertainty.  
B. Jus Ad Bellum Proportionality  
 Even if a country were subject to an armed attack—whether 
through a single big assault or through the accumulation of several 
smaller ones—the country does not get license to respond as 
intensely as it pleases. An armed attack awakens the right to self-
defense. Self-defense does give a country the right to retaliate much 
more forcefully than it could to transgressions that do not 
constitute an armed attack, but the scale of the retaliation is still 
limited by the rules of jus ad bellum. 
                                                                                                            
70. Id.  
71. See Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 
Rep. 161, 331–33 (Nov. 6) (separate opinion by Simma, J.).  
72. See DINSTEIN, supra note 65, at 211 (discussing support for the view that 
events can cumulatively equal an armed attack that allows for self-defense); 
Christian J. Tams, The Use of Force Against Terrorists, 20 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 359, 388 
(2009); Cf. Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. Rep. 
161, 333 (Nov. 6) (separate opinion by Simma, J.) ("there is in the international law 
on the use of force no "qualitative jump" from iterative activities remaining below 
the threshold of Article 51 of the Charter to the type of "armed attack" envisaged 
there"). 
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 If an attack is in progress, the attacked country is allowed to 
use force that is necessary for the purpose of repelling that 
attack.73 However, scholars have argued that countries are allowed 
to use force not just in order to halt an ongoing attack.74 Even after 
the attack has ended, another legitimate purpose for using force is 
to deter the enemy that initiated the attack from committing future 
attacks.75 The enemy must realize that further attacks will be 
reciprocated and will prove costly for it as well.76 
 When a country sets out to deter future attacks by an 
aggressor, it is constrained to retaliate in a manner proportional to 
the scale and the effects of the initial attack.77 In other words, 
scholars limit the response countries are allowed to use against an 
armed attack by a tit-for-tat rule.78 
 As mentioned regarding incidents falling under the threshold 
of an armed attack, in situations that involve two well-governed 
and equally powerful states, a tit-for-tat rule may lead to optimal 
deterrence and minimize conflicts. Both countries will consider 
that their actions will be answered in kind and try to preserve the 
peace. However, countries that are facing a much weaker enemy 
that cannot fully restrain militants operating from its border are 
facing the same dilemma described in the previous subpart. 
Responding immediately and with proportionate force may play 
into the hands of dissident groups and spark a conflict both sides 
would like to avoid. In contrast, ignoring persistent attacks may 
easily be abused by a rival country.  
 What is required is a strategy of many-tits-for-many-tats: 
delaying the response to the armed attacks, but when several 
attacks pile up, issuing a powerful response. Once again, 
international lawyers view this reasonable solution as legally 
legitimate. Scholars have argued that when a country is subjected 
to a series of separate attacks, it is allowed to respond by using one 
powerful counterstrike.79 Scholars refer to each one in the 
sequence of armed attacks as a “pin-prick.”80 The response to a 
series of “pin-pricks” needs to be proportional to the aggregate effect 
of the entire sequence of attacks.81 
  
                                                                                                            
73. See Kretzmer, supra note 68, at 269–70.  
74. See id. at 268–69. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. See id. at 269, 272. 
78. Id. 
79. Robert Ago (Special Rapporteur to the International Law Commission), 
Eighth Report on State Responsibility, ¶ 121, UN Doc. A/CN.4/318/ADD.5-7 (1980). 
80. DINSTEIN, supra note 65, at 275. 
81. Id. 
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C. Blurring the Lines Between Jus Ad Bellum and Jus in Bello 
 A final area in which the logic of many-tits-for-many-tats is 
echoed by the laws of war concerns the diluting of jus in bello 
obligations for countries fighting a just war. Traditionally, 
international law drew a sharp distinction between jus ad bellum 
and jus in bello obligations. Even if a country is allowed to use force 
under jus ad bellum, it is still constrained by jus in bello—for 
example, it cannot cause excessive harm to civilian targets even 
when pursuing legitimate military objectives.82 
 Lately, however, scholars have called for blurring the 
dichotomy between jus ad bellum and jus in bello. They realized 
that in recent conflicts the international community was willing to 
grant extra leeway in the application of jus in bello rules if the use 
of force was particularly justified under jus ad bellum.83 In other 
words, when a country fights an especially just war, the 
international community tends to accept harsher military methods 
as legitimate.84 
 The potential for abuse engrained in this trend is obvious. 
Every country tends to think its cause is just and to use every 
ambiguity for its benefit.85 Countries could reciprocate the harsh 
measures taken against them and dropping the constraint of jus in 
bello rules may plunge both sides into committing horrible crimes. 
Scholars have realized that and suggest that strict rules like the 
prohibition against intentionally killing civilians should not be 
bent even when fighting a just war.86 In contrast, the vague 
standards of jus in bello, such as the prohibition against causing 
excessive harm to civilians when attacking military targets, are 
quite imprecise anyway and they do not provide real protection, 
particularly in cases of asymmetric conflicts where both parties are 
trying to overwhelm and shock the enemy.87 Scholars have 
therefore argued that in modern asymmetric conflicts, accepting 
the trend which allows harsher methods—challenging the normal 
boundaries of jus in bello—when conducting a just war is 
recommended.88 This trend can give the international community 
a fuller and more truthful picture of the military conduct of 
countries.89 
 Relaxing the boundaries between jus ad bellum and jus in 
bello can serve a strategy of many-tits-for-many-tats. Countries 
that hold back and do not respond to repeated attacks can prove to 
                                                                                                            
82. See FRANCOISE BOUCHET-SAULNIER, THE PRACTICAL GUIDE TO 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 509 (3d English Language ed. 2014).  
83. Eyal Benvenisti, Rethinking the Divide Between Jus ad Bellum and Jus 
in Bello in Warfare Against Nonstate Actors, 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 541, 544–45 (2009). 
84. Id.  
85. See Ariel Zemach, Indeterminacy in the Law of War: The Need for an 
International Advisory Regime, 43 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1, 12–13 (2017).  
86. Benvenisti, supra note 83, at 546. 
87. Id.   
88.  Id. at 548.  
89.  Id.  
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the international community that they gave peace a chance and 
were forced to go to war against their wishes. Once the 
international community views such a country as fighting a just 
war, the country may get a special permission to engage in 
particularly harsh military tactics, which strain the boundaries of 
traditional jus in bello doctrines. 
 
*** 
 The analysis in this Part suggests that while the laws of war 
traditionally embrace a tit-for-tat strategy, they tend to accept a 
strategy of many-tits-for-many-tats, particularly in situations of 
asymmetric warfare where such a strategy is recommended by a 
game theoretical analysis. Countries subject to assaults that do not 
constitute an armed attack are usually constrained to strictly 
proportional responses. But these countries can accumulate many 
assaults and view them together as an armed attack, opening the 
door to a much harsher response while executing the right to self-
defense. When a country is subject to repeated armed attacks, it 
can respond with disproportionate force that equals the aggregate 
severity of the entire series of attacks launched against it. Finally, 
a country that restrained itself in the face of numerous attacks may 
be viewed as fighting a just war. There are powerful voices in the 
international community calling to release such a country from 
some jus in bello obligations, allowing an extreme military 
response.  
IV. DISPROPORTIONATE PENALTIES FOR REPEAT OFFENDERS 
 The most fundamental tenet of criminal law is that criminals 
can only be punished after they have been convicted of a crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt.90 In other words, criminal punishment 
is only justified when a court is certain that the accused committed 
a crime. The entire premise of this Article is that a strategy of 
many-tits-for-many-tats is useful in situations when punishment is 
meted out under conditions of uncertainty. Are such conditions 
even relevant for criminal law?  
 There have been theoretical suggestions to modify the system 
that requires a high threshold of certainty before any criminal 
penalty is justified. Some scholars have suggested combining the 
probabilities that a suspect committed several distinct crimes to 
deduce that he committed at least one unspecified crime beyond the 
required threshold of certainty.91 Others have suggested adjusting 
the level of punishment to the degree of certainty that a suspect 
committed a crime instead of requiring a minimal threshold of 
                                                                                                            
90. See Alon Harel & Ariel Porat, Aggregating Probabilities Across Cases: 
Criminal Responsibility for Unspecified Offences, 94 MINN. L. REV. 261, 265 (2009).  
91. See generally id.  
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proof.92 Nevertheless, these suggestions are categorically opposed 
to the laws existing in most criminal systems.  
 Traditional criminal law requires a minimal level of certainty 
in the sense that the court must be convinced that a specific person 
committed a specific crime. The question is why? What will happen 
if an innocent man will be convicted of a crime he did not commit? 
The answer cannot be based purely on considerations of deterrence. 
It may seem intuitive that if an innocent man is convicted, 
deterrence will suffer—because his choice between alternative 
courses of action will be not guided anymore by the fear of 
punishment. However, the picture is a bit more complicated than 
that. If a crime has a tangible consequence such as robbery or 
murder, the possibility of convicting the wrong person will not 
damage the deterrence of potential criminals. If the crime is not 
committed, nobody will be convicted, giving potential criminals an 
incentive not to commit the crime in order to avoid punishment. 
The more distant possibility of being convicted of a completely 
different crime committed by somebody else does not change 
depending on the potential criminal’s actions and therefore does 
not damage the incentive not to commit crimes.93 Convicting the 
innocent will actually damage deterrence only under very refined 
and rare conditions.94 
 It seems that the reason criminal law is committed to the 
requirement of certainty has to be based on non-consequentialist 
grounds. It is immoral to punish people for a crime they did not 
commit, even if this punishment will lead to beneficial results. At 
the same time, when somebody does commit a crime, he incurs a 
duty to remedy the consequences of his actions. The criminal 
system is therefore allowed to cause harm to true criminals in 
pursuit of instrumental goals such as increasing deterrence.95  
 Scholars that adhere to a strong version of retributivism would 
go even further. They would argue that the criminal system is 
allowed to punish criminals in a manner proportional to the 
severity of the crimes they have committed, and some would say 
that the government is required, not only permitted, to issue this 
penalty.96 This strong version of retributivism adopts a tit-for-tat 
rule—it envisions the punishment of every crime with a 
proportional penalty.  
                                                                                                            
92. See generally Talia Fisher, Conviction Without Conviction, 96 MINN. L. 
REV. 833 (2012).  
93. See generally Henrik Lando, Does Wrongful Conviction Lower Deterrence, 
35 J. LEGAL STUD. 327 (2006).  
94. See id. at 332.  These conditions include a situation where the legal 
system mistakes the nature of the act committed, giving criminals an incentive to 
commit a more severe crime instead of a less severe one if that increases their payoff, 
for example bringing a real gun instead of a toy gun to a robbery. This analysis is 
similar to the problem of marginal deterrence—if the criminal receives a high 
penalty anyway, why would he avoid committing a more severe crime? Id. 
95. See TADROS, supra note 3, at 2–4. 
96. See id. at 1–2.  
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 Every legal system has to deal with some uncertainty. Because 
the methods of establishing legal truth are imperfect, some 
innocent people will inevitably be convicted and some guilty people 
will inevitably be acquitted. The fear of convicting the innocent is 
reflected not in denying the possibility of false convictions, but in 
the proportion of false convictions to false acquittals that the 
system is ready to accept. Scholars have even developed a formula 
that finds the connection between the level of certainty required to 
convict and the proportional value society puts on these two 
mistakes.97 Obviously, the more damaging the conviction of the 
innocent and the less damaging the acquittal of the guilty, the more 
certainty should be required before conviction.98 
 Nevertheless, legal systems are generally committed to the 
idea that it is mandatory to prove to a high level of certainty that a 
criminal committed every act he is punished for. This contradicts 
the conditions that call for a strategy of many-tits-for-many-tats: 
that there is a high level of uncertainty about the commission of 
each individual transgression and only the accumulation of several 
transgressions attests to the fact that an individual is intentionally 
misbehaving. 
 This Part will therefore not say anything about convicting 
people who were not proven guilty beyond the high threshold of a 
reasonable doubt. Instead, it draws a distinction between two types 
of criminals: “career offenders”—people who chose a life of crime—
and “incidental offenders”—people who have committed a crime but 
do not intend to pursue crime as a way of life. The legal system is 
convinced that both criminals committed the crimes of which they 
were convicted. It is legitimate to punish both of them on 
retributivist grounds. However, issuing a more severe penalty to 
career offenders may be beneficial for society for instrumental 
reasons. The strategy of many-tits-for-many-tats is not manifested 
by delaying the conviction of criminals for their first criminal acts. 
Instead, it is manifested by issuing a much harsher penalty once 
several convictions have accumulated, because these repeated 
convictions indicate that the crimes were committed by a career 
offender. The criminal laws of numerous jurisdictions adopted 
doctrinal solutions that follow that logic.99 This Article will focus 
on one such doctrinal solution: the “three-strikes-and-you’re-out” 
rule.100 
 This Part proceeds by first investigating whether it is at all 
legitimate on retributivist grounds to distinguish between career 
offenders and incidental offenders and to punish the former more 
severely. It then draws on empirical evidence and theoretical 
                                                                                                            
97. See John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. 
L. REV. 1065, 1073–77 (1968). 
98. Id.  
99. See George P. Fletcher, The Recidivist Premium, 1 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 
54, 54–55 (1982). 
100. See generally Helland & Tabarrock, supra note 10.  
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arguments that concern the activation of the “three-strikes-and-
you’re-out” rule to establish whether treating career offenders more 
harshly can actually reduce crime. This analysis takes into account 
the response of criminals to actual or potential penalties and 
suggests that criminal law bears some resemblance to the repeated 
prisoner’s dilemma game described above.  
A. Why Career Offenders May Deserve a Higher Penalty 
 The logic of many-tits-for-many-tats recommends issuing a 
much more severe penalty for the last in a series of convictions. 
This type of penalty may or may not be beneficial for society; as the 
next subparts show, this is a complicated empirical question. But 
some retributivists would say that proving that a disproportional 
penalty is beneficial for society is not enough to justify it. A penalty 
is justified only if it is fair; that is, if the criminal deserves it. Only 
after establishing that a penalty is fair is it permitted to ask what 
the consequences of punishment are.101 
 Scholars have reviewed several potential justifications for 
disproportionately punishing recidivists. One possibility is to claim 
that a person that was already convicted of several crimes and 
persists to commit crimes is expressing a clear defiance of the 
state’s authority, which justifies a harsher penalty. However, 
scholars have argued that this ground for punishment is morally 
flawed.102 In a liberal society, punishment is not meted out to 
cement the authority of the state as it is in dictatorial regimes.103 
Although a contrite criminal may receive some leniency from the 
state, a defiant criminal does not deserve to be punished more than 
a contrite criminal, because his actions were not more 
reprehensible.104  
 The privilege of the state to be more lenient than the criminal 
deserves raises another possibility: perhaps all penalties for non-
recidivists are deliberately lenient and only recidivists get the 
punishment they deserve. From this perspective, the punishment 
of recidivists is not disproportional to the severity of their crimes; 
it only seems out of proportion to the deliberately mild 
punishments issued for first-time offenders. It is true that some 
jurisdictions use recidivism only as a reason not to be lenient 
compared to what an offense deserves. However, many recidivist 
                                                                                                            
101. Michael Davis, Just Deserts for Recidivists, 4 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 29, 35 
(1985).  
102. Id.   
103. Id. 
104. See id. at 35–36. Even Andrew von Hirsch—who supposedly argued that 
a repetitive offender is more culpable because he defies the authority of the state—
denied that he made this argument. Von Hirsch clarified that he only suggested 
previous convictions could weigh against granting a lenient judgment, which is 
justified on other grounds. Id. (citing ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE 
CHOICE OF PUNISHMENT (1976)). See also GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING 
CRIMINAL LAW 465–66 (2000) (describing Von Hirsch’s argument).   
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penalties clearly give a disproportionately high penalty for a 
repeated offense, and some—like the three-strikes-and-you’re-out 
rules—do not even aspire for any connection with the last crime 
committed, they simply lock somebody up for good.105 Unless you 
are committed to the strange proposition that every felony deserves 
a life sentence—which would clearly preempt any serious 
discussion on the fairness of penalties—this line of argumentation 
cannot explain many forms of harshness toward recidivists.106 
 The most promising avenue to justify severely punishing 
recidivists passes through a peculiar thought-experiment devised 
by the philosopher Michael Davis.107 Imagine that people are 
forced to buy a license to commit crimes in a public auction. This 
strange image takes into account the fact that committing crimes 
is a way to take advantage of society in an unfair way. People who 
commit crimes gain from breaking the rules that govern society and 
they should be made to pay for that in proportion to the damage 
they cause to society.108 This logic would dictate that more severe 
crimes receive more severe penalties. It may also suggest that 
recidivists receive a slightly higher penalty, because in order to get 
the right to commit multiple crimes they should be made to buy a 
special license—a license to buy several licenses to commit 
crimes.109 
 Davis’s analysis is helpful, but it can only explain a marginally 
higher penalty for recidivists. It cannot even begin to explain laws 
such as three-strikes-and-you’re-out. However, a slight 
modification to the rules of the auction would provide a better 
justification. In Davis’s thought-experiment, the state cannot know 
the identity of the person bidding for the right to commit crimes.110 
In contrast, his analysis acknowledges the possibility of an auction 
where people reveal their true character before they buy the 
license.111 If the state can know who the bidder is, it may require 
a much higher price for licensing a professional criminal than for 
licensing an amateur.112 The professional criminal may know 
much better than a non-professional how to use crime to his 
advantage.113 Even more importantly, he may get away with many 
crimes without getting caught.114 When a professional criminal 
buys a license, the actual damage to society is particularly high.115 
                                                                                                            
105. See Davis, supra note 101, at 31.  
106. See id. at 39.  
107. See generally id. 
108. See id. at 38–39. 
109. See id. at 41–43.  
110. Id. at 40. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
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 It is an empirical question whether recidivists are really 
professional criminals or not.116 But the possibility that the state 
can reveal the character of criminals by observing them over a long 
time is exactly what many-tits-for-many-tats is all about. Many-
tits-for-many-tats is superior in a noisy environment, where the 
true actions of adversaries cannot be ascertained with absolute 
certainty. Nevertheless, an accumulation of many signals helps 
form a picture of the strategy of the adversary. Similarly, when a 
person is caught and convicted of several crimes, the state can 
deduce that he is a career offender. As the auction metaphor 
demonstrates, career offenders deserve a higher penalty, because 
their propensity to take advantage of the rest of society is greater 
than that of incidental offenders.  
 All this only implies that career offenders deserve a higher 
penalty, but to justify issuing such a penalty it must serve some 
consequentialist purpose.117 Whether a harder penalty for 
recidivists actually helps society is an empirical question, but it can 
also be analyzed theoretically based on some plausible 
assumptions. The following subparts will investigate the effects of 
the three-strikes-and-you’re-out laws on incapacitation and 
deterrence. This analysis will take into account the cost of 
punishment, which allows for an analogy to Axelrod’s tournaments 
of the repeated prisoner’s dilemma.118 
B. Incapacitating Career Offenders 
 The analogy to the repeated prisoner’s dilemma is not perfect. 
The state and the criminal are not two symmetric opponents. It 
would be quite useless to model the strategic responses that 
criminals can implement against the far more powerful state. 
Nevertheless, the situation as far as the state is concerned does 
resemble a repeated prisoner’s dilemma in some respects. 
 In a repeated prisoner’s dilemma, it is beneficial to play 
cooperate against a friendly but responsive rival program and it is 
beneficial to play defect against a program that intentionally 
defects against you. In a noisy tournament, the problem is how to 
identify which programs are deliberately defecting and which 
played cooperate but were manipulated by the game-master. 
 The parallel between the repeated prisoner’s dilemma and 
criminal law is that it is useful to treat an incidental offender as a 
friendly program and a career offender as an intentionally 
defecting program. It is beneficial to release incidental offenders 
from prison after a period that is long enough to sustain the regime 
of deterrence. Every extra day in prison costs taxpayers a lot of 
money for lodging, food, and security, and prevents a citizen from 
                                                                                                            
116. See id. (suggesting that recidivists are not necessarily professional 
criminals).  
117. See id. at 46.  
118. See supra Part II.A.  
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working and contributing to society.119 In contrast, under some 
conditions, it may be useful to keep career offenders incarcerated 
for a much longer period in order to incapacitate them—to make it 
physically impossible for them to commit more crimes out of prison. 
The problem faced by the state is how to identify who is an 
incidental offender and who is a career offender so that it can 
incapacitate only the latter.  
 One of the justifications for the three-strikes-and-you’re-out 
rule is that it can effectively incapacitate career offenders while 
avoiding excessive penalties for incidental offenders. If the rule 
works, a possibility which many empirical studies have tried to 
establish or refute, it can change the selection of prisoners and 
ensure that even with the same number of prisoners there will be 
a greater proportion of career offenders to incidental offenders 
behind bars.120 
 Three-strikes-and-you’re-out works exactly like a rule of 
many-tits-for-many-tats in this respect. The legal system requires 
several convictions to be convinced that someone is a career 
offender and mete out a very long sentence that would effectively 
incapacitate him from committing more crimes. Before several 
convictions are accumulated, the penalties will be lower and will 
not attempt to incapacitate criminals for long periods. By delaying 
the response of the state and gathering information about the type 
of the criminal, the efforts of incapacitation can be used more 
efficiently. 
C. Improving Deterrence for Career Offenders 
 Punishing criminals by incarceration is expensive. The 
previous subpart suggested that the costs of imprisonment 
outweigh the benefits of incapacitation regarding incidental 
offenders. In contrast, incapacitation is more useful regarding 
career offenders and may actually outweigh the costs of 
imprisonment. Nevertheless, it is possible that keeping a man in 
prison for the rest of his life is more expensive than the harm he 
would cause to society on the loose, even if he is a career offender. 
Part of the reason for that is that crimes are usually committed by 
young people and the chances that someone will continue to commit 
crimes after a decade or so in prison are small.121  
                                                                                                            
119 See Becker, supra note 44, at 180. For an up-to-date assessment of the 
costs of incarceration, see Eliza Mills, How Much Does it Cost to Send Someone to 
Prison, MARKETPLACE (May 19, 2017, 4:00 PM), 
https://www.marketplace.org/2017/05/15/world/how-much-does-it-cost-send-
someone-prison [https://perma.cc/NH4M-YV9A] (archived Aug. 16, 2018).  
120. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, GORDON HAWKINS & SAM KAMIN, 
PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA 92 
(2001) (explaining the argument that three-strikes-and-you're out is useful to 
incapacitate specifically the most dangerous criminals, but providing evidence that 
incapacitation due to the three strikes rule did not cause the decrease in crime in 
California in the nineties).  
121. See Shepherd, supra note 10, at 160. 
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 Still, incarceration of career offenders may ultimately be 
beneficial because it can deter other criminals and thus assist in 
reducing crime. To determine whether three-strikes-and-you’re-out 
laws are advantageous, the costs of implementing them must be 
weighed against the combined benefits of incapacitation and 
deterrence. 
 A common mistake made when analyzing the deterrent effect 
of three-strikes rules is to calculate only the deterrent effect of the 
third strike. But where only the third strike is concerned, three-
strikes laws may actually have a detrimental effect on deterrence. 
Usually, a higher penalty deters more crimes, but there are 
situations in which the threat of a severe penalty can actually be 
counterproductive. The most common situation of that sort is the 
lack of so-called “marginal deterrence” caused by the threat of a 
severe penalty.122 For example, if the penalty for armed robbery 
with two previous strikes is a life sentence, more criminals would 
decide to kill their victims and thus reduce the chances of getting 
caught. When a criminal faces the maximum penalty for a crime he 
already committed, he cannot be deterred from committing even 
worse crimes that can help him escape from the law.  
 Scholars have argued that three-strikes-and-you’re-out laws 
fail exactly because they reduce marginal deterrence.123 Criminals 
who already have two strikes have an incentive to kill law 
enforcement officers, witnesses, or victims to reduce their chances 
of getting caught, thereby increasing the rate of homicides.124 This 
suggests that if only the deterrence of the third strike is taken into 
account, three-strikes laws may actually lead to worse crimes.  
 But focusing only on the deterrence of criminals with two 
previous strikes ignores a crucial part of the picture. People who 
consider becoming career offenders must realize that every strike 
gets them closer to the third strike and makes a future life sentence 
a real possibility. Because they are career offenders, the possibility 
that they will be caught for future crimes must loom much larger 
for them than for incidental offenders. Empirical research suggests 
that this deters potential criminals from committing even their 
first or second crime.125  
                                                                                                            
122. There are other conditions in which a high penalty is counterproductive 
that are not so relevant here. See generally Saul Levmore & Ariel Porat, Threats 
and Criminal Deterrence in Several Dimensions, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1333 (2017) 
(discussing the general effects of penalties on the credibility of threats and 
blackmailing); Uri Weiss, The Robber Wants to Be Punished (Hebrew Uni. of 
Jerusalem, Federman Ctr. for the Study of Rationality, Discussion Paper No. 685, 
2015) (discussing the problem of making threats by a criminal to cause further harm 
credible because of the penalty he will suffer for the initial offense of issuing an 
illegal threat).  
123. See Thomas B. Marvell & Carlisle E. Moody, The Lethal Effects of Three 
Strikes Laws, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 89, 89–93 (2001) (arguing that three-strikes-and-
you're-out laws decrease marginal deterrence and providing evidence that they 
increased homicides). 
124. Id.  
125. See Shepherd, supra note 10, at 162, 174.  
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 The application of a many-tits-for-many-tats strategy 
therefore has a clear downside—a life penalty for the third strike 
can damage marginal deterrence and lead to more homicides. At 
the same time, three-strikes laws can prevent people from 
becoming career offenders by giving them an incentive to avoid 
even their first crime. Just like in the noisy tournaments described 
above, people know that the state observes their actions. Once the 
state is convinced they are career offenders, the penalty will be 
severe. Rational people will often be deterred and decide to avoid a 
life of crime.  
*** 
 The jury is still out on whether three-strikes laws prevent 
more crime through the combined mechanisms of incapacitation 
and deterrence.126 Nevertheless, supporters of such laws can use 
the logic of many-tits-for-many-tats to back their position.  
 Observing the behavior of criminals over several strikes before 
subjecting them to a life sentence can both help incapacitate more 
career offenders and deter people from becoming career offenders.  
In contrast, the strategy of tit-for-tat—a proportional penalty for 
every offense—will not distinguish between career offenders and 
incidental offenders and therefore will likely do worse in terms of 
both deterrence and incapacitation of career offenders. 
 
V. DELAYED RESPONSES IN INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW 
 Many-tits-for-many-tats is often used by individuals against 
each other without the need for a special law or even for a 
contract.127 When a lobsterman sets traps in the territory of his 
neighbor, he is usually warned that his actions violate the norms 
of the community.128 If warnings do not help and the violations of 
territoriality persist, a neighboring lobsterman will inflict 
disproportional damage on the transgressor by destroying some of 
his lobster traps.129 Note that the punishing neighbor would not 
                                                                                                            
126. There are many different views on whether better deterrence is reached 
when repeat offenders are punished more severely. See Harel & Porat, supra note 
90, at 289–90 (providing numerous references to literature on the question). There 
are also studies directed specifically at the deterrent effect of three-strikes laws. See, 
e.g., Helland & Tabarrok, supra note 10 (comparing the arrests of people who were 
released from prison in California in 1994 with two “strikes” to those released with 
two trials for strikable offenses but only one conviction that constitutes a strike; 
finding that the third strike provisions reduced arrests for criminals with two 
strikes by 17 to 20 percent); Cassandra K. Crifasi et al., Effects of State-Level Policy 
Changes on Homicide and Nonfatal Shootings of Law Enforcement Officers, 22 
INJURY PREVENTION 274, 276 (2016) (finding that three-strikes laws were correlated 
with a 33 percent increase in fatal assaults of law enforcement officers).  
127. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS 
SETTLE DISPUTES 218–19 (1991). 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
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just take away traps or lobsters—these actions are profitable for 
the punisher and can therefore be interpreted as an act of self-
interest instead of a deliberately inflicted sanction.130 Instead, the 
neighbor would cause great damage in a way that sends a clear 
message.131  
 Scholars have noted that a similar pattern of warning, 
waiting, and finally inflicting disproportional damage on 
transgressors appears in numerous community settings.132 This 
pattern ensures that only intentional transgressions will be 
punished and also that the punishment will be understood as a 
deliberate sanction.  
 When two parties sign a contract, they create a special 
relationship which resembles a repeated prisoner’s dilemma. In 
each round of the game, the seller has an incentive to provide 
cheaper and inferior goods and the buyer has an incentive not to 
pay fully and on time. But both the seller and the buyer have to 
care about the future. If they cheat the other party and get caught, 
that party may respond by cheating them in return, damaging their 
good name in the industry by bad gossip, or turning to legal 
sanctions. A tit-for-tat strategy would be useful to ensure optimal 
cooperation between contractors who can fully observe each other’s 
conduct.   
 But just like in a noisy tournament, sometimes breaches of the 
contract are not intentional. Sometimes, the seller did not know 
that the goods were defective or they were damaged during 
transit.133 At other times, a buyer suffered from an unexpected 
cash-flow problem and was unable to pay at the agreed-upon 
date.134 Contractors who want to continue their fruitful 
collaboration should not retaliate against unintentional and 
unavoidable infringements. However, simply ignoring previous 
infringements would also be a bad strategy as it would allow the 
other party to take advantage of one’s generosity.  
 The strategy required is many-tits-for-many-tats: studying the 
behavior of the other party and only when it is established that the 
cheating is intentional, responding disproportionately. The 
following subparts suggest first that contractors actually follow 
this strategy and explain how the law can avoid interfering with 
their ability to do so. Later, the CISG general strategy of tit-for-tat 
responses for breaches of contract is described. An exception to that 
strategy, the Nachfrist Notice procedure used in the CISG, is 
                                                                                                            
130. Id. 
131. Id. (describing the pattern of a fisherman’s gradual escalation of force). 
132. See id. at 217–19 (mentioning the example of cattle farmers in Shasta 
County and referring to several other examples).  
133. See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: 
Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 
1724, 1775 (2001) [hereinafter Bernstein Private Commercial Law]. 
134. See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the 
Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1808 (1996) 
[hereinafter Bernstein Merchant Law].  
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explained as an attempt to institutionalize a many-tits-for-many-
tats strategy for conditions of uncertainty.  
A. Non-Legal Sanctions in Contractual Relations 
 In some lines of business, the chances of inadvertent breach 
are high even when the proper precautions have been 
implemented. When the product can be easily damaged during 
storage or transportation, it is difficult to discern whether the seller 
provided a defective product intentionally or not. Scholars have 
argued that the cotton industry is such a market.135  
 Buyers in the cotton industry find themselves in a situation 
which resembles a noisy tournament: they cannot know for sure if 
the seller intended to defect, or if the goods were damaged against 
the seller’s will. A game theoretical analysis would recommend a 
strategy of many-tits-for-many-tats in situations of this kind. 
Instead of responding immediately by ending the business 
relationship or using negative gossip against the seller, the buyer 
should wait and observe several shipments until it is convinced 
that the seller deliberately provides defective goods. Then the 
buyer should respond with especially harmful gossip.  
 Scholars have suggested that business practices concur with 
this strategic analysis. Buyers are often willing to forgive several 
breaches without retaliation.136 Eventually, when buyers are 
convinced that the breaches are intentional, they can gossip 
against the sellers in the business community. By issuing well-
substantiated gossip that records several breaches, the harm 
caused to the reputation of the seller is much higher than if the 
gossip addressed a single violation.137 Furthermore, the buyer has 
to shoulder the costs of issuing such gossip only once instead of 
several times.138 
 The strategy of many-tits-for-many-tats is applied by 
contractors without the need for judicial intervention. In fact, some 
courts that view the concessions of contractors as a business norm, 
which changes the parties’ actual contractual obligations,139 may 
be causing more harm than good. Scholars have demonstrated that 
contractors are willing to ignore several breaches because they 
trust each other and want to continue the business relationship.140 
Forcing contractors who compromised in the past to systematically 
overlook all future breaches or to accept breaches even when the 
                                                                                                            
135. See Bernstein Private Commercial Law, supra note 133, at 1775.   
136. See id. at 1776.  
137. See id. at 1777–79. 
138. See id. 
139. The attempt to change the parties' obligations according to existing 
business norms underlines, for example, Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
See Bernstein Merchant Law, supra note 134, at 1766.   
140. Bernstein Private Commercial Law, supra note 133, at 1776–77. 
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business relationship ended badly would change their incentives 
and devastate the ability of contractors to cooperate.141 Parties 
would be less likely to let small breaches go without a sanction if a 
court can later hold them liable for similar generosity in all future 
interactions.142 
B. Tit-for-Tat under the CISG 
 The previous subpart demonstrates that forcing parties by law 
to forgive violations just because they did so in the past is a crude 
and potentially harmful strategy. Courts often do not possess the 
information that is held by the parties and that guides their 
strategic responses. They therefore cannot strategize instead of the 
parties to the contract.143 However, this does not mean that the 
law cannot provide rules that would facilitate the use of many-tits-
for-many-tats by contractors. The Nachfrist Notice procedure in the 
CISG discussed in the next subpart is such a rule. But this 
procedure is an exception to the general regime of the CISG that 
promotes a tit-for-tat strategy, a strategy that is efficient under 
conditions of certainty.   
 The CISG—the United Nations Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods—is an international treaty 
designed to introduce a uniform regime that regulates the 
international sale of goods.144 International sales sometimes 
provide excellent opportunities, but they are fraught with special 
challenges. Parties must overcome legal differences across 
jurisdictions in addition to differences of business culture and 
language.145 By creating a uniform contractual regime that applies 
between all parties from countries that ratified the CISG,146 the 
ability of the parties to predict the rules that will be applied to them 
is significantly improved. Predictability increases the ability of the 
parties to conclude efficient international deals.147 
                                                                                                            
141. See Bernstein Merchant Law, supra note 134 at 1803–04. 
142. See Lisa Bernstein, Custom in the Courts, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 90–92 
(2015).   
143. See Bernstein Merchant Law, supra note 134, at 1803–04; Bernstein 
Private Commercial Law, supra note 133, at 1776–77.  
144. See CISG, supra note 13, art. 7(1).  
145. See JOSEPH F. MORRISSEY & JACK M. GRAVES, INTERNATIONAL SALES 
LAW AND ARBITRATION: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND COMMENTARY 29–45 (2008) 
(describing these and other challenges that arise especially in international sales).   
146. See CISG, supra note 13, art. 1(1)(a) (stating that the CISG will apply if 
both parties come from countries that ratified the CISG). See also id. art. 1(1)(b) 
(stating that the CISG will apply if the rules of private international law lead to the 
application of the laws of a country that ratified the CISG, unless that country opted 
out of this source of jurisdiction when it ratified the CISG).  
147. See BRUNO ZELLER, CISG AND THE UNIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE LAW 27–28 (2007) (discussing the certainty that CISG offers as a uniform 
law).  
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 The CISG is committed to saving contracts in order to salvage 
the gains that both parties make from trade.148 That is why a 
limited breach of the contract by the seller does not automatically 
grant the buyer the right to avoid the contract. Instead, the buyer 
can exercise a series of milder sanctions that resemble a tit-for-tat 
strategy. 
 If the seller delivers nonconforming goods, for example, the 
CISG allows the buyer to reduce the price only proportionately to 
the difference between the value of the goods actually delivered and 
the value that conforming goods would have had at that time.149 In 
this way, the financial damage that the buyer can cause the seller 
equals exactly the damage that the seller caused the buyer. The 
same rule of proportional price reduction applies if the seller 
delivers only a part of the goods.150 
 Most importantly, both parties to the contract can sue for 
damages that equal all the losses caused to them by a breach of 
contract by the other side. The damages may not exceed the loss 
that the breaching party foresaw or ought to have foreseen when 
the contract was concluded.151 The tool of suing for damages allows 
both parties to retaliate proportionately, requiring the other side to 
pay exactly the losses it intentionally or negligently caused by the 
breach. 
 If the violation committed by a contractor is extreme, it may 
constitute a fundamental breach. A breach is considered 
fundamental if it substantially deprives a contractor of what it is 
entitled to expect under the contract, unless the breaching party 
did not foresee this result and a reasonable person would not have 
foreseen it.152 A fundamental breach essentially eliminates all the 
gains that a party expected to get from the contract. If a party 
commits a fundamental breach, the other party is entitled to avoid 
the contract.153 This is a proportional response—the breaching 
party destroyed all gains for the other party by a fundamental 
breach so that party gets to destroy all the gains of the breaching 
party from the deal. The tit-for-tat strategy is clearly manifested in 
the additional rule that if a party committed a fundamental breach 
regarding a specific installment, the other party may declare the 
contract avoided regarding that installment.154 
 The use of tit-for-tat by the CISG is efficient under conditions 
of certainty. When both parties are aware of each other’s actions, a 
                                                                                                            
148. See Peter Huber, CISG—The Structure of Remedies, 71 RABEL J. COMP. 
INT'L PRIVATE L. 13, 28 (2007).  
149. See CISG, supra note 13, art. 50.  
150. See id. art. 51.  
151. See id. art. 74.  
152. See id. art. 25.  
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154. See id. art. 73(1).  
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proportional response can deter contractors from committing 
violations and save as much as possible of the gains from trade. 
C. The Nachfrist Notice Procedure 
 The Nachfrist Notice rule, in contrast, is designed to deal with 
conditions of uncertainty. This rule allows the buyer who faces a 
seller that did not deliver on time to set an additional period of 
reasonable time by which the seller must perform. If the seller does 
not perform within the additional period fixed by the buyer, the 
buyer may declare the contract avoided.155  
 This rule resembles a rule of many-tits-for-many-tats. The 
response of avoiding the contract by the buyer is not immediate—
the seller gets extra time in which it can perform the contract. The 
response is also not proportional because the contract is avoided 
even if the breach is not fundamental. Usually, a delayed delivery 
does not by itself constitute a fundamental breach.156 Avoiding the 
contract would destroy all the gains of the seller from the deal.  
 The Nachfrist Notice rule of many-tits-for-many-tats is ideal 
for conditions of uncertainty. Imagine that you are a buyer that 
bought some heavy equipment for your factory. The seller was 
supposed to deliver the equipment three days ago but did not. 
Every day of delay costs money, and the seller does not answer your 
calls. Your losses may start mounting soon as without the 
equipment you cannot honor your own commitments to customers. 
You have no idea if the buyer intends to comply eventually and, if 
so, when. Issuing a Nachfrist Notice allows you to deal with this 
uncertainty. Within the reasonable time that you set, you will 
either receive the equipment you ordered or get the right to avoid 
the contract.157 
*** 
 To sum up, a contractual relationship often looks a lot like a 
repeated prisoner’s dilemma. In light of that, a tit-for-tat strategy 
can be used to maximize cooperation in contracts and constitutes 
the main regime adopted by the CISG. However, in situations of 
particular uncertainty, a tit-for-tat strategy can lead to too many 
mistakes. Merchants facing uncertainty because of potentially 
unintentional damage to goods sometimes react by adopting a 
strategy of many-tits-for-many-tats. The Nachfrist Notice 
procedure in the CISG is also a form of many-tits-for-many-tats 
that can be used in conditions of uncertainty.  
  
                                                                                                            
155. See id. art. 49(1)(b), 47(1).  
156. See MORRISSEY & GRAVES, supra note 145, at 227 (saying Article 47 
provides a way for the buyer to limit late deliveries by the seller but does not 
typically allow the buyer to declare the contract voided if there is late delivery).  
157. See Ericson P. Kimbel, Nachfrist Notice and Avoidance Under the CISG, 
18 J.L. & COM. 301, 301–03 (1999) (describing such a scenario and highlighting the 
role of the Nachfrist Notice in providing certainty and predictability).  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 The path of the law is wiser than the transient people who 
walk it. The laws of war, criminal law, and international sales law 
have this in common: they all developed over decades by legislators, 
judges, and other lawyers who were trying to promote cooperation 
and deter wrongdoing. It is little wonder that all these fields exhibit 
doctrines that track the fundamental insights of game theory.  
 Under conditions of certainty, a tit-for-tat strategy is 
conducive to promoting cooperation. By allowing immediate and 
proportional responses, tit-for-tat effectively deters attempts to 
exploit others. This is why tit-for-tat strategies are so pervasive in 
the law and proportionality became an almost sacred principle 
traversing all areas of both private and public law.158 
 But when certainty breaks down because the actual actions 
and intentions of others are not easily observable, tit-for-tat fails. 
It can lead to mistaken retaliations and sometimes provoke endless 
waves of counterreprisals. The strategy of many-tits-for-many-tats 
delays the response to transgressions until the true intentions of 
the transgressor are exposed. To maintain deterrence, many-tits-
for-many-tats then recommends a disproportionate response. This 
strategy is manifested in several doctrines of the laws of war, 
criminal law, and international sales law that address conditions 
of pervasive uncertainty.  
 Legal doctrine acquired the wisdom of strategically supporting 
cooperation over time by addressing specific circumstances. It 
would be foolish to ignore the insights acquired through 
generations of experience. But the conditions that the law seeks to 
address never rest. They change all the time. To keep up with 
changes and learn how to properly address them, a deeper 
understanding of the logic behind the law is required.159 Such a 
deeper understanding is the purpose of this Article.  
                                                                                                            
158. See TADROS, supra note 3, at 36.  
159. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 991, 
1001 (1997). 
